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that he could not have fallen so gently without Hsui Chieh's approval. Years later, he even married his grandson to Hsu's granddaughter and composed essays on Hsfi's birthday and other occasions, suggesting that he had somehow prepared an exit which helped him avoid public disgrace in 1565 and warm up the relationship later on.
Tung Fen's high-level network in retirement
Tung Fen faded into obscurity at the age of 56 on account of the abrupt termination of his official career. The Yen Sung stigma made it impossible for him to stage a political comeback. Although he himself was no longer a player on the central stage of power, he was determined not to cut himself off from court politics. To that end he cultivated multiple kinship and teacherdisciple relationships. Tung Fen's wife, a daughter of Wu P'eng, former Minister of Personnel, once said to her husband, "There are no commoners in our families."17 Indeed none of their children and grandchildren married into ordinary families. Tung Tao-ch'un i , Tung Fen's only son, married the daughter of Mao K'un *. Mao K'un (1512-1601), also from the 1541 class and Tung's fellow provincial, did not advance his career as successfully as Tung Fen. Yet he was regarded as an accomplished essayist and a military strategist in literati circles, and he had a handsome fortune. Tung's daughter was married to Hsiu T'ai-shih Cfi4 (cs of 1580, 1540-1598),18 of whom more will be said later.
As for the third generation, Tung Tao Another key to long-term eminence was academic success. Prominent families often vanished from the political and social scene after one or two generations due to failure in academic pursuits. Pressing his son and grandsons to prepare for the civil service examinations became Tung Fen's personal mission. He chose teachers and selected friends for them, people who had mastered the writing of examination essays. His primary goal was to mold his son and grandsons into competitive candidates and successful bureaucrats. Trained by the best tutors, Tung Ssuch'eng received his chin-shih degree at the age of 21 in 1580. His father Tung Tao-ch'un took his belated chin-shih in 1583. The much younger grandson Tung Ssu-chao *JUW got his degree at the remarkable age of 20 in 1595. Behind this success lay not only study and preparation, however, but also political connections and money. Tung Fen was alleged to have paid 20,000 taels of silver to Chang Wei WM-(cs of 1568, grand secretary, 1592-1598) to guarantee the chin-shih degree for Tung Ssu-chao. 20 To these impressive kinship ties and academic successes were added crucial teacher-disciple relationships cultivated through the civil service examinations. Among Tung Fen's disciples were Shen Shih-hsing (also, as noted, related to Tung Fen by marriage) and Wang Hsi-chuieh 3E5,-(1534-1611), the two most prominent members of the 1562 class. With the passing of Chang Chiu-cheng XJgI (1525-1582), the powerful grand secretary at "9 Shen Shih-hsing, birthday essay for Tung Tao-ch'un's wife, Ssu-hsien-t'ang chi, ch. 15, pp. 23a-b. Tung Fen was a native of Hu-chou, Che-chiang province, but he viewed himself as a native of Wu-chiang district (in Su-chou prefecture, Nan Chih-li) as well. As a matter of fact, the Tung family cemetery was in Wuchiang, not to mention its extensive landed holdings there. In this sense, Tung Fen and Shen Shih-hsing were related not only through the teacher-disciple relationship and marriage, but also through their geographic affiliation with Suchou. 20 another chin-shih of 1541, had had a notorious reputation for humbling himself to Yen Sung as his adopted son.24 In terms of pleasing the powerful at court, Hsui T'ai-shih obviously inherited the ingratiating skills of his own father and of his father-in-law, Tung Fen, whose connection with the senior grand secretaries, especially Shen Shih- 21 The period between the 1540s and 1582 witnessed a number of powerful grand secretaries in charge of government affairs, beginning with Yen Sung, followed by Hsui Chieh, Kao Kung, and ending with Chang Chu-cheng. See Shen Te-fu, Wan-li yeh-huo pien, ch. 9, pp. 596-598, 641-643. After the death of Chang, the Wan-li Emperor played a significant role in weakening the cabinet in an attempt to prevent grand secretaries from becoming too powerful. Although the emperor was pleased with a much weaker cabinet, factional struggles arising from the tension between the grand secretaries and junior officials loomed on the horizon, and paralyzed the central bureaucracy in the end.
22 Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ming-Ch'ing chih-chi tang-she yun-tung k'ao, pp. 12-14. 23 Wu Yuan-ts'ui, Lin-chii man-lu, ch' ien-chi, ch. 2, p. 467. Court politics during the post-Chang Chui-cheng era deteriorated quickly, largely due to factional struggles. As Ch'ien Ch'ien-i noted, "Officials working for Chiang-ling (i.e., Chang Cha-cheng) were competent horses, whereas officials affiliated with the grand secretaries after Chang were no more than shrewd foxes and cunning rats." These "foxes" and "rats," in his opinion, were only good at seeking their own interests and engaging in factional struggles. amounted to 240,000 mu of land.32 The Hsiis' landed estates were scattered both in Nan Chih-li and Che-chiang province. It was quite common for these great families to employ their chief servants and adopted sons to seek profit and manage landed estates and other sorts of business. Adoption was practiced in sixteenth-century Chiang-nan as a major form of the master-servant relationship. A bond was forged by which a person was forced to surrender his own surname and take his master's as a way of pledging his loyalty and obedience. In most such cases, a contract was signed to witness this subjugation.33 In principle, the statuses of "adopted son" and of "bondservant" were distinct. In other words, one could be a bondservant or an adopted son, or both. But in reality the line between the two categories was often obscured.
The contract granted the master full authority not only over the life of his adopted son or bondservant but also over the fate of the latter's family. An adopted son was placed at the mercy of his master. According to one observer, "As soon as the contract is signed, he dares not stand straight in front of his master; nor does he dare be negligent whenever he is called for service. 
147
his family members were ineligible to take the civil service examinations.
At the expense of personal freedom, a bondservant or adopted son often found himself financially better off than an impoverished free man. "Given that a bondservant is often assigned to manage his master's business, he has a good opportunity to make a fortune of his own. Even a dull person in this situation doesn't worry about basic needs such as food and clothing."35 An adopted son enjoyed the protection of his adopted father. According to the contract, "he is not subject to outsiders' harassment. His master shall protect him if an outsider attempts to assault him."36
The master-servant relationship was complex and did not always work in favor of the master. Sometimes an adopted son betrayed his master by surrendering himself and his master's property to someone more wealthy and powerful. This betrayal took his old master by surprise and dragged him into a miserable lawsuit. He found himself confronted by the bondman's new master. Such legal disputes reflected aggressive land competition in which great families encroached upon "middle-class" families by seducing or encouraging the latter's adopted sons to commend their masters' property to them. Evidently, the Tung family engaged in those activities.37
In fact, the relationship between Tung Fen and his adopted sons provides us with a perfect example of these practices as they flourished in the sixteenth century. He had at least fifty of them,38 whom he trained as his most aggressive and loyal henchmen in his pursuit of affluence. In the process of enriching himself Tung allowed his adopted sons to build up their own family ` Wang Chia-chen, p. 30. 36 Ibid., p. 30. 37 In 1580 Ts'ai Chin-sung (see above, note 33) ran into conflict with the sons of his late adopted father, Chin Shih-neng. He then surrendered himself and a portion of the property of the Chin family to the Tung family to seek its protection, and had his name changed to Tung Sung as a result of this second adoption. See Che-fu tsou-shu, ch. 4, p. 9b. Ting Yuan-chien described a similar incident in which a servant surrendered not only his master's property but also the master's wife and children to the brother of Shen Shih-hsing's wife. See his Hsi-shan jih-chi, ch. 2. 
JIE ZHAO
Tung Fen, reflecting on his 80 years, must have felt satisfaction that nothing had really prevented him from getting what he desired-power, wealth, and academic success. What he wanted very much now was to look forward to an elaborate funeral with an official eulogy. As the former minister of Rites, however, Tung Fen knew that his past government service created considerable difficulty in achieving this goal. According to regulations, the court did not offer official condolences to officials, such as himself, who had been impeached and subsequently removed from office.48 Yet principle often yielded to politics; his relatives and prot6g6s were senior court officials who would help him to work this out.
The maneuver began with a rather modest request. It was Ts'ai Hsi-chou *MS, a touring censor in Che-chiang province, who took the initiative. He was known as one of the eight attack dogs commanded by Shen Shih-hsing and Wang Hsi-chfieh. Apparently on behalf of his patrons,49 he submitted a memorial to the court in which he suggested that the government should consider offering a courtesy greeting to the aging Tung Fen, former minister of Rites.50
Ts'ai Hsi-chou's memorial triggered a court debate. The opposition to his request was led by Wan Kuo-ch'in AMk, also a censor. In his argument, not only did Wan remind his colleagues of Tung Fen's history of association with Yen Sung, but he also exposed Tung's horrendous behavior in local society. He charged that Tung Fen manipulated local politics and abused local people. Because of his powerful connections, local officials bowed to him and dared not investigate; his neighbors were furious, but dared not speak out. Wan then argued, "If we were to approve this request, he (Tung) would go around to encroach more land and take away more wives and daughters from ordinary people. What is worse, to approve this request is only the beginning; it would pave the way for a second request asking for 48 and appeasing the angry people by promising them a fair investigation. He chose the latter. With the aide of his colleagues P'eng Ying-ts'an ; a touring censor in Che-chiang province at that time, and Chang Ying-wang , the magistrate of Wuch'eng district, the governor looked into the legal complaints which charged the Tung family with numerous counts of misconduct. A number of chief servants from the Tung family were arrested and interrogated.65 Protesters hailed the provincial administration's endeavor to redress abuses, and filed their complaints with the local government.
Tung Fen considered the provincial administration's position shocking. In a letter to an influential scholar-official, he bitterly complained that this official investigation was unprecedented in Hu-chou prefecture.66 Heretofore, Tung had turned local officials into his "friends" using presents and reminders of his capital connections. Now Tung was convinced that the provincial governor of Che-chiang and the governor of Nan Chih-li (who was cooperating with the former since many holdings of the Tungs lay in his jurisdiction), both Shan-tung natives and same-year chinshih, had teamed up to give him a hard time.67 Indeed, these two were neither proteges, nor relatives, nor Tung's fellow provincials. In other words, they did not associate with his network, and therefore they did not feel obligated to protect his interests. Moreover, the two governors, motivated by a sense of justice, committed themselves to aggressively pursuing high-profile cases.68 Incidentally, it turned out that virtually all of her charges were false, as attested to by the report prepared by the new governor, Liu Yuan-lin WCALI, who replaced Wang Ju-hsiin. After a thorough investigation, Liu wrote that her nephew's wife had been sick for a long time (not pregnant) and had died in early 1593; contrary to the widow's charge, it was her husband's chief servant who shocked her to death. The nephew dared not file a lawsuit against that servant. As for the charges related to the mob's intrusion into the family compound, the governor reported that the houses stood magnificent without having lost a single piece of wood or brick; the family cemetery was covered with thick vegetation and tall trees; and no one had gone into the family compound smashing, killing pigs and sheep, drinking and making noise, as she alleged.74
Before any of these facts were known, the complaint of Fan's widow reached to the Wan-li emperor. The emperor reportedly became outraged by the news that Fan Ying-ch'i, his former tutor, killed himself under pressure both from the mob and from the provincial administration's investigation. An imperial edict was issued which removed governor Wang and dispatched imperial guards to arrest censor P'eng Ying-ts'an and magistrate Chang Ying-wang.75 These three were blamed for having mishandled the Shen felt that this conversation heightened Fan Ying-ch'i's fear and drove him to mental collapse and suicide. Then, Tung Fen helped Fan's widow to draft the complaint and urged her to go to the capital the day after the death of Fan. At the same time, he encouraged his powerful associates at court to take care of her appeal. Before P'eng Ying-ts'an's memorial arrived in the capital, the imperial edict to arrest P'eng had been issued. P'eng's memorial was blocked. What a magic spin and maneuver!89 Shen Ping-hsuin's testimony supports the allegations regarding Tung Fen's role in the counterattack. If Tung was indeed a dying man in 1594, he surely remained capable of some rather remarkable feats. He used Fan's suicide as a turning point from which to mastermind a superb counterattack. His associates opened the way for Fan's widow to approach the Wan-li emperor, blocked the provincial memorial from going to the emperor, and gave no opportunity for the accused to defend themselves. As soon as the emperor's temper was aroused, Tung Fen's associates delivered an imperial edict which knocked down his enemies-the provincial governor, the censor, and the magistrate of Wu-ch'eng district.
Conclusion
The court intervention blocking the provincial investigation of the Tung family was not unprecedented. A precursor to the case 88 Ibid., ch. 3, pp. 8a-8b. 89 Ibid., ch. 3, p. 8b. It is important to note that Shen Ping-hsun did not originate, but only reinforced, the view that Tung Fen masterminded the whole counterattack which successfully toppled the top provincial officials. Shen's take on this issue has its special merit owing to his family's close ties with the Tung family. T'an Ch'ien too held the same position. See Kuo-ch'ueh, ch. 76, p. 4739. Tung Fen, like Hsut Chieh, was no ordinary wealthy provincial. He was a cunning politician who knew exactly how the political system worked and had great capacity to manipulate politics to satisfy his needs. His close connections with power holders secured his presence in local politics and protected his family's wealth and prestige in local society.
To a considerable degree, the dispute between the provincial administration and Tung Fen was an unfortunate coincidence. This happened not only because the governor was not associated with Tung's network, but also because he intended to exercise his full judicial authority as the representative of the state over the dispute between the Tung family and the angry locals. This was an unusual combination of circumstances. The dispute was abruptly resolved by the court intervention, the result of a desperate but carefully crafted counterattack which enabled Tung Fen to turn the tables on his prosecutors and emerge victorious.
Tung Fen's case shows us how central and local politics were intricately interrelated to create "safe havens" and protect the great families' interests in local society. Networks of kinship, regional affiliations, and teacher-disciple relationships linked local elites to power holders at court. In this regard, local politics in a large prefecture like Hu-chou was not just local, and residents of elite status were not simply local elites. They sometimes had the ability to overturn a governor's decision, close investigations, or even remove provincial officials from office.
The Tung family survived a major crisis, but its victory was shadowed by three deaths. Tung Fen passed away in the third month of Wan-li 23 (1595). Within a month, his grandson Tung Ssu-chao, who had just received his chin-shih degree, died unexpectedly in the capital. The passing of his grandfather and brother broke the heart of Tung Ssu-ch'eng, and he too died at the end of that year. They had enjoyed power, prestige, and 9( Wu Yuan-ts'ui, Lin-chiu man-lu, ch. 1, p. 31.
